信息资源管理学报 ›› 2023, Vol. 13 ›› Issue (3): 100-111.doi: 10.13365/j.jirm.2023.03.100

• 计量经济模型 • 上一篇    下一篇

“粉丝福利”的经济学分析:考虑主播长期声誉的直播电商价格谈判研究

杨思懿 窦一凡   

  1. 复旦大学管理学院,上海,200433
  • 出版日期:2023-05-26 发布日期:2023-06-09
  • 作者简介:杨思懿,硕士生,研究方向为电子商务、信息系统经济学;窦一凡,教授、博导,研究方向为电子商务、信息系统经济学,Email: yfdou@fudan.edu.cn。
  • 基金资助:
    本文是国家自然科学基金(71822201 、72241424)、上海市教育发展基金会和上海市教育委员会“曙光计划”和2022中国信息经济学乌家培资助计划资助(M22106023)的研究成果之一。

Best Deals for Livestreaming Fans:A Negotiation Model under the Anchor’ s Reputation Concern

Yang Siyi Dou Yifan   

  1. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433
  • Online:2023-05-26 Published:2023-06-09

摘要: 在直播电商中,主播在粉丝市场中的声誉既影响了其与商家合作时的谈判能力,又关系到其长期的职业生涯发展。针对主播对长期声誉的关心和商家对短期利润的关注之间的矛盾,本文建立了纳什谈判模型考察主播的声誉关心效应对直播折扣价格协商的影响。结果表明,主播的声誉关心效应对折扣的影响是非单调的。有趣的是,更关心自己声誉的主播反而可能得到更小的折扣。适当的声誉关心可以同时提升商家、主播和粉丝三方的福利。

关键词: 直播电商, 主播, 声誉关心效应, 纳什谈判, 折扣

Abstract: In live-streaming e-commerce shows, the reputation of anchor plays a central role because it simultaneously affects the brand-side price negotiation and the anchor-side long-run profitability. This paper examines the effect of the anchors’ reputation on price negotiation with Nash bargaining model in light of the conflict between brands’ myopic focus on one-off profits and anchors’ focus on long-term reputation. Our analytical and numerical results suggest that the negotiated price is non-monotonically affected by the reputation concern. An anchor with a greater reputation concern may receive a smaller discount. Besides, the brand, the anchor, and consumers all benefit when the anchor has a moderate concern for his or her reputation.

Key words: Livestreaming, Anchor, Reputation concern, Nash bargaining, Discount

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